I Tempi del processo penale. L'attesa della pena: filosofia, diritto, esistenza

La tesi propone un'introspezione sull'attesa del giudizio e sui tempi del processo penale.

This thesis investigates the temporal and existential dimension of the criminal process, starting from the hypothesis according to which awaiting trial can be configured as a form of early punishment, informal and without legal recognition. While based on the principles of the presumption of innocence, the humanity of the sentence, and the reasonable length of the trial, criminal justice subjects the accused to an experience of suspension, uncertainty, and suffering that precedes the definitive determination of responsibility and which, in some cases, even prescinds from conviction. The work addresses trial time not only as a parameter of efficiency of the judicial apparatus, but as lived time, capable of impacting identity, dignity, relationships, and the individual's ability to plan his or her future. From this perspective, a tension emerges between the provisions of Article 27 of the Constitution and the concrete experience of the man subjected to trial, exposed to social stigma, uncertainty, and the progressive compression of his own existential freedom. The analysis develops at the intersection of philosophy of law, process theory, literature, and constitutional reflection. Francesco Carnelutti's thought allows us to focus on the centrality of man as the authentic res iudicanda; Franz Kafka and Albert Camus illuminate the dimensions of expectation, alienation, and the incomprehensibility of judgment; Friedrich Nietzsche offers an interpretative key to the relationship between time, memory, and the impossibility of fully inhabiting the present. The research also examines the remedies provided by the legal system against unreasonable trial duration, with particular reference to the Pinto Law, questioning their actual ability to compensate for suffering that is not fully quantifiable or reversible. The ultimate goal is to demonstrate how the criminal process can produce, even in its own duration, an autonomous form of suffering similar to punishment, prompting reflection not only on the efficiency of justice, but on its ethical and anthropological legitimacy and the need to place humanity, its time, and its waiting at the center of legal discourse.