The remarkable increases in life expectancy observed over the last decades have posed a major challenge to pension funds and annuity providers because of the related systematic longevity risk. This article proposes a variable payout life annuity where benefits have to follow the observed mortality and the interest rates obtained. This scheme is effective and efficient for annuity providers, who always have a fund that matches exactly the undertaken commitments to annuitants. On the other hand, potential reductions in the benefit payments can be felt by annuitants more bearable than those that include a safety loading. Specifically, the concept of observed survival probabilities is introduced and applied to: (a) translate a demographic change into the related financial adjustment; (b) decompose a demographic change into two effects, one stemming from the survival probability observations and the other from life table updates; (c) show that the financial compensation mechanism should run for single cohorts to avoid creating inequalities for older and smaller cohorts.
Tackling longevity risk by means of financial compensation
Cinzia Di Palo
2019-01-01
Abstract
The remarkable increases in life expectancy observed over the last decades have posed a major challenge to pension funds and annuity providers because of the related systematic longevity risk. This article proposes a variable payout life annuity where benefits have to follow the observed mortality and the interest rates obtained. This scheme is effective and efficient for annuity providers, who always have a fund that matches exactly the undertaken commitments to annuitants. On the other hand, potential reductions in the benefit payments can be felt by annuitants more bearable than those that include a safety loading. Specifically, the concept of observed survival probabilities is introduced and applied to: (a) translate a demographic change into the related financial adjustment; (b) decompose a demographic change into two effects, one stemming from the survival probability observations and the other from life table updates; (c) show that the financial compensation mechanism should run for single cohorts to avoid creating inequalities for older and smaller cohorts.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.