How much do Intellectual Capital, Ownership Structure and the Board of Directors affect the Performance of Italian listed companies?

Purpose – The objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between some aspects of governance (such as ownership structure and characteristics of the board), the efficiency of intellectual capital and the economic and market performance of a sample of Italian listed companies. Design/methodology/approach – This study investigates a sample of forty Italian listed companies during the period 2002-2012, whose shareholder weight is equal to approximately 50 percent of the total market capitalization. In particular, through regression analysis there will be an examination of the relationship between economic and market performance and the efficiency of intellectual capital, the characteristics of the board and the ownership structure of the companies investigated. In addition, a few control variables (debt ratio, size, industry and firm age) will be used to measure the impact on the regression analysis. Originality/value – This methodology highlights both the relationship between the efficiency of intellectual capital and the performance of firms and the influence that the governing body can have on the efficiency of intellectual capital. The research on the one hand extends the existing literature on some aspects of corporate governance and intellectual capital; on the other hand it aims to test the importance of the ownership structure and the characteristics of the board of directors as a means of creating value in firms. Practical implications – The outcome of the application, in addition to enhancing knowledge on the relationship between ownership structures, the characteristics of the board, the efficiency of intellectual capital and business performance, intends to determine if the board of Italian listed companies affects the determination of business results and the management of intellectual capital. Moreover, the results could be useful both for policy makers in order to regulate the size of the boards and their independence with respect to the ownership, and also for enterprises in determining compensation and benefits.