In recent years the myth of creation of value for all shareholders, that for decades has inspired several economic researches, appears succumb to the widespread practice of value creation for the controlling shareholders, above all in the listed companies. The dichotomy doesn’t concern the relationship between the shareholders and the other stakeholders, but rather is related to the relationship between the ownership as a whole and the controlling shareholders, which acquire the entire control of the company, exasperating the dissociation between voting rights and cash flow rights. In turn, the possibility to take on the control with an investment of resources kept down can drive the controlling shareholder to the strategic choices not value oriented, above all when these involve excessive risks compared to those arising from ordinary business management . This possibility grows in the presence of dual class, shareholders agreements, and pyramidal structures, that allow the separation between voting rights and cash flow rights.

PROPRIETA' E CONTROLLO: DUAL CLASS, PATTI PARASOCIALI E GRUPPI PIRAMIDALI. UN'ANALISI SULLE SOCIETA' QUOTATE ITALIANE.

INTRISANO, Carmelo
2009

Abstract

In recent years the myth of creation of value for all shareholders, that for decades has inspired several economic researches, appears succumb to the widespread practice of value creation for the controlling shareholders, above all in the listed companies. The dichotomy doesn’t concern the relationship between the shareholders and the other stakeholders, but rather is related to the relationship between the ownership as a whole and the controlling shareholders, which acquire the entire control of the company, exasperating the dissociation between voting rights and cash flow rights. In turn, the possibility to take on the control with an investment of resources kept down can drive the controlling shareholder to the strategic choices not value oriented, above all when these involve excessive risks compared to those arising from ordinary business management . This possibility grows in the presence of dual class, shareholders agreements, and pyramidal structures, that allow the separation between voting rights and cash flow rights.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11580/2238
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