In this paper the international telecommunication market is analyzed in order to evaluate the impact of different strategic behaviours of telecommunications carriers. Using the Nash fixed threat bargaining model, we formalize the carriers bargaining behaviour in a growing competitive pressure market. The effect of competition is considered both in the final market and in the intermediate one, in which carriers compete on tariffs to get an appropriate distribution of profits. We show that carriers may have an incentive to a cooperative behaviour in the setting of tariffs and the results of such behaviour in terms of final prices depends upon the competitive pressure degree they are subject.

Strategic Behaviours in International Telecommunications System

CRICELLI, Livio;
2001

Abstract

In this paper the international telecommunication market is analyzed in order to evaluate the impact of different strategic behaviours of telecommunications carriers. Using the Nash fixed threat bargaining model, we formalize the carriers bargaining behaviour in a growing competitive pressure market. The effect of competition is considered both in the final market and in the intermediate one, in which carriers compete on tariffs to get an appropriate distribution of profits. We show that carriers may have an incentive to a cooperative behaviour in the setting of tariffs and the results of such behaviour in terms of final prices depends upon the competitive pressure degree they are subject.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11580/10284
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